This article interrogates the link between urbanity and 'precarity of place' for non-citizen populations, relying on evidence drawn from the transnational homeland activities of Burmese migrants in two global cities (Bangkok and Tokyo). First, the article builds upon literatures of precarity and global cities to detail the complexity of urban spaces in relation to migration, and draws upon understandings of political mobilisation to explain homeland activism among non-citizen populations. It then focuses respectively on Bangkok and Tokyo, demonstrating the ways in which migrants from Burma of varying precarity utilise or forgo urban structures in each city. The article concludes that precarity does not necessarily reduce homeland activism, but may change its outward appearance. Urban structures, to a greater or lesser extent, influence that relationship.
Introduction
A simple set of cyclical relationships explains why there have been such clear theoretical and empirical links drawn between urban geography, migration, and transnationalism. Cities attract migrants. Migrants are more likely to engage in transnational activities than nonmigrants. Transnational activities are easily supported by the infrastructure that cities provide. Thus, it is easy to understand that a highly-skilled worker who could obtain a work visa for Tokyo, for example, would choose to do so, how she might frequently engage in transnational activities such as information and/or resource exchange with friends or family from home, and why a place like Tokyo would help facilitate such exchange. It is less clear, however, why a migrant without a work visa might choose the same path. That is, the effect of precarity on urbanity, migration, and transnationalism is less clear.
Precarious migrants may have different motivations for migrating. Their transnational behaviour may be quite different, as their focus on home may take on a more contentious hue.
And the cities to which they migrate may or may not offer the same advantages of urbanity to precarious populations as they do to documented migrants. It is not clear, at the outset, if the same relationships hold for all migrant populations. This article, then, introduces the element of precarity into the discussion about urbanity, migration, and transnational action. Focusing on a subset of transnationalism -that of homeland activism, wherein migrants engage in transnational action specifically designed to introduce reforms in the home country -and empirically comparing the experience of Burmese migrants in two global cities, Bangkok and Tokyo, this article asks: which phenomenon is more salient for homeland activists: urbanity or precarity? Put another way, does urbanity (i.e., the uniqueness of urban space) facilitate migrants' participation in homeland activism or does the precarity of non-permanent migration stem it? 1 In seeking to answer this question, the article first builds upon the literatures of precarity and global cities to detail the complexity of urban spaces in relation to migration, and draws upon understandings of political mobilisation to explain homeland activism among non-citizen populations. It then focuses respectively on Bangkok and Tokyo, demonstrating the ways in which migrants from Burma of varying precarity utilise or forgo urban structures in each city.
The article concludes that precarity does not necessarily reduce homeland activism, but may change its outward appearance. Urban structures, to a greater or lesser extent, influence that relationship.
Precarity, Urbanity, and Homeland Activism
In investigating whether the phenomenon of 'urbanity' or 'precarity' is more salient for urban migrants engaged in homeland activism, the paper will first explore the concept of precarity, and then overlay that on the global cities literature. Finally, it will locate several nexuses that detail the complexity of urban spaces in relation to precarity, migration, and political mobilisation.
Precarity
The notion of precarity describes the condition of being vulnerable to exploitation because of a lack of security. Most commonly the precarity literature refers to insecurity in the workplace, and Standing's oft-cited work on the precariat details seven forms of labour security that are absent in the condition of precarity (2011: 10) . Yet the notion of precarity has theoretical traction elsewhere, especially its discussion of precarity's source in and "other aspects of intersubjective life, including housing, debt, and the ability to build affective social relations" (Neilson & Rossiter 2005 : n.p.). This latter definition, while useful in allowing us to understand the many ways that precarity can be experienced, is difficult to measure for the purposes of this article, in which we are interested in varying levels of precarity among migrant populations. Because the primary element that defines migrants' lack of security is their ability to remain in the host country, this article will use the threat of removal, deportation, or detention as its measure. Thus, for the purposes of this article, precarity is defined as: "the extent to which an individual is vulnerable to removal, deportation, or detention because of his or her legal status and/or possession of documentation, or lack thereof, in the host country." This is the author's definition. 2 Further on, in each city section, various types of legal status and their relationship to precarity will be elaborated upon.
Urbanity
The global cities literature is an entryway to understand urbanity -defined in this paper simply as the unique features of an urban landscape. Originating from 1980s scholarship that examined the relationship between flows of capital and differentiated flows of labour, and between highly formalized industrial financing and highly informal wages in the urban workplace, (Friedmann 1986; Sassen-Koob 1984) , the global cities scholarship contends that contemporary capitalist structures have placed global cities on par with nation states themselves, commanding profound concentrations of wealth and power (Sassen 2001 encouraged by governments welcoming temporary seasonal workers, and yet others are international students or environmental refugees (Standing 2011: 93) . Such movement of migrant labour is in keeping with an "economic logic" (Sassen 2001: 34) , because, despite the movement of capital and manufacturing jobs to countries where labour is cheap, many jobs -often those that fulfill the 3Ds ('dirty, demanding, and dangerous') -must be performed in the capital-intensive environments that characterize cities. These include the repair, maintenance, and cleaning of industrial property and services delivered in hospitals, restaurants, and child/elderly care. Jobs such as these do not necessarily require local knowledge or language skills, and their increasing demand has led to a "casualisation of work" (Sassen 2001: 285) and "facilitate(s) the employment of disadvantaged foreign workers" (Sassen 2001: 34) . Despite Sassen's exhortation that we "get over the sense of an immigration control crisis" (2000: 73) and strengthen international protocols and procedures for protecting migrants, the international migration regime's current priority is border protection, not migrant rights' protection.
If global cities fuel a system that runs on precarity, they also possess three features that, paradoxically, may appeal to the precarious. First, cities facilitate anonymity (Wilson 1991 ).
Urban density notwithstanding, "neighbours may not know each other and tend to relate through telematics and automobiles with friends, relatives and entertainment sources 
Political Mobilisation and Homeland Activism
This article uses the term 'homeland activism' to describe migrant activities that are geared toward making changes in the homeland, using transnational means. There are at least two sets of interlocking literatures that examine the modes and mechanisms of migrants involved in homeland activism: theories of political mobilisation and transnationalism. While neither will be explored here in detail, a short discussion will help to build a relationship between mobilisation and precarity.
The literature on social movements -a "constituency lacking formal representation… that make(s) publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of power" (Tilly Since then it has been noted that "the notion of precarity has provided a rallying call and connecting device for struggles surrounding citizenship, labour rights, the social wage, and 
Precarity, Urbanity, and Migration
This review has demonstrated that "global cities are typically sites of heightened economic to obtain migrants with a range of precarity levels. Third, interviews were supplemented by direct observation at cultural and political meetings with transnational purposes, such as closed strategic planning meetings and public ethnic celebrations and political protests. In all cases, respondents were assured anonymity, both in name and regards to the specific organisations for which they worked.
Field research -both interviews and direct observation -was triangulated by in-depth media analyses of international, regional and local media from 1997 to 2007. This helped to gauge the public face of homeland activism and to substantiate migrants' claims and perceptions of precarity. Data were analysed to determine first, if there was a correlation between precarity and homeland activism, and second, if urban structures played a role in shaping that relationship. While there have been significant changes inside Burma following the temporal scope of this field research, the focus here remains on that window, before recent reforms had commenced.
Bangkok
Eight interviews were conducted with homeland activists in Bangkok: 3 had no documentation whatsoever, rendering them highly precarious. The other 5 possessed status or documentation (or combinations thereof) that gave them some sense of security, albeit temporary. The possession of a work permit (held by one informant) was the most precarious -first, work permits at that time were only granted for two years maximum, second, it only permitted regional travel (i.e., not outside of the greater Bangkok area) and third, it required that its holder work full time in factories or fields, meaning that any political work had to be conducted at other times. 4 The possession of a student visa (held by two informants) offered slightly more protection, as did Burmese passports (held by three informants Three important points emerge from this examination of documentation, restrictions, and associated precarity: first, protest activities in Bangkok should not be thought to reflect the patterns and heft of homeland activism in other parts of Thailand. The argument in this section is merely that despite significant precarity, homeland activism remained, and it questions if urbanity played a role. 6 Second, the mere fact of engaging in any homeland activities was liable to render protestors precarious. Third, and related, homeland activism not only made individual protestors more insecure, but increased restrictions on the entire movement. As one NGO informant explained, every time a group engages in homeland activism that can be traced to migrants and/or refugees, the publicity is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it brings publicity for the cause, but on the other hand, it inevitably leads to a swift response from government officials to crack down against political activists, whether their activities are public are not. First, through media activism, political actors engaged in the collection, framing, and delivery of information from inside Burma to distribute to regional and international media sources.
The transnational work of obtaining true and accurate, as well as real-time, news from inside Burma is an activity not unique to Bangkok as a global city, and, in fact, is easier to carry out in areas near the border. This is one of the reasons why numerous exiled media groups are located closer to the border, such as the Irrawaddy and Mizzima in Chiang Mai and publications from the Karen Human Rights Group in Mae Sot. Nevertheless, Bangkok, as an international city and a hub for travel in Southeast Asia, continues to play a role as a gateway city where sources from inside Burma are projected to larger audiences. As one activist noted, "The guy from the Wall Street Journal doesn't want to take the bus to Mae Sot." 8 As the home of two international English newspapers, Bangkok's position as a regional focal point for news is uncontested.
All 3 undocumented respondents were engaged in media activism (as well as one respondent with a passport), suggesting that precarity did not serve as a deterrence. Rather, the most important criterion was an internet connection in one's private home. As crowded as private spaces might be, with migrants living in very close quarters (one respondent noted living with two other families in two bedrooms) 9 it was here, rather than in public internet cafés, where activists penned articles for the aforementioned publications produced by Burmese exiled media. In addition, media activists were called upon as sources to confirm information, where, in the midst of the capital's anonymity, they were able to meet in local coffee shops/food stalls to talk to reporters from international and regional newspapers, including those printed out of Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and United Kingdom. 10 Bangkok's plentiful internet connections and anonymity aided media activism, even for the most precarious.
Second, activists both received and delivered educational training in Bangkok, where they engaged in courses of varied lengths that covered issues such as current events, regional politics, international law, the substance of human rights, researching human rights, and human rights advocacy. Some courses targeted migrants (both documented and undocumented), where discussions about labour rights in Thailand were coupled with assertions about the importance of democracy in Burma. 11 Recent scholarship confirms this merging of labour rights and the promotion of democracy, observing that for one important labour organisation, "regime change and democratisation are necessary preconditions for substantial improvements in migrants' socio-economic situation" (Arnold 2012: 96). Other courses' students hailed primarily from inside Burma, where the precise purpose of the courses was to prepare participants, once finished, to return to their communities (either inside Burma or on the Thai-Burmese border) in order to put into practice the transnational knowledge they obtained. Most of these students were highly precarious, having arrived in Thailand without documentation. Trainings such as these (and participants' positions of precarity) were not unique to Bangkok and in fact were more likely to take place in areas where the vast majority of refugees from Burma reside (i.e., along the Thai Burmese border) but Bangkok's trainings were, in the words of one international staff of a Bangkok training, "close to centers of power. This is the closest we can bring our students to government officials and UN agencies." 12 Indeed, trainees not only studied in Bangkok, but attended media events, lectures, and report launches, for example. Bangkok's plentiful and sprawling housing made it possible to house such trainings, and its anonymity and extensive public transportation permitted trainees both with and without documentation to attend at least some events. 13 Third, homeland activism was undertaken through lobbying. Bangkok's ability to draw regional as well as international powerholders made it the logical meeting place for homeland activists to meet with the representatives of both governments and NGOs that were sympathetic to the cause of democracy in Burma. These meetings were generally of a concealed nature, and included, for example, a meeting between Bangkok-based homeland activists and US representatives to discuss UN Security Council treatment of Burma.
14 Another meeting occurred between activists and ASEAN parliamentarians to discuss the potential for ASEAN to serve as a pressure point for change in Burma, particularly to campaign against Burma securing the Chairmanship of ASEAN at that time. 15 Finally, activists met with regional advocacy organisations looking to communicate directly with the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs to apply pressure on Burma. 16 Clearly, Bangkok's position as a regional hub facilitated such lobbying. Interestingly, lobbying was undertaken by activists with varying levels of precarity -both the undocumented and those with passports.
This may indicate that official legal status is less important than personal connections when activists are engaged in homeland activities with high-level powerholders.
Finally, while greatly reduced when compared to previous years, public protests did occur in These are difficult questions to answer, for two reasons. First, motivation for remaining in Bangkok was not the subject of interviews when they were conducted in 2005, although some conclusions can be extrapolated from their circumstances. Second, devotion to the cause of democracy in Burma is such an important part of activists' narrative that it tends to overshadow other factors, particularly in discussion with a researcher who is asking specifically about homeland activism.
One figure that sheds some light on this question, however, is that of the 8 migrants interviewed, 6 received financial compensation for their work. It can be assumed that their salaries (a term used loosely as there is no evidence of official contractual obligations)
provided its recipients with a way to make a living. That is, activism was their employment.
It may be that, given the choice between living safely at the border or remaining gainfully and meaningfully employed in Bangkok but faced with precarity of place, some chose the latter. We might term this the 'logic of the activist' (as differentiated from the logic of activism) because it emphasises choices made by individuals, rather than consider them as decisions of units of a social movement.
The 'logic of the activist' by no means suggests that activists worked only for salaries, but it does suggest that Bangkok was a draw for reasons other than its global city features. We can surmise that there were other reasons for remaining in Bangkok: at least two informants had family members that planned to remain in Bangkok for a long time. Those on student visas were enrolled in Bangkok-based universities, and valued the education they were receiving.
Another said he found Bangkok less precarious than the border: "Mae Sot is more dangerous (than Bangkok) because within a half hour you can be back in Burma." 20 And all 8 conveyed the importance of the work that they were doing.
While it is difficult to separate out migrants' personal choices from political strategies of their organisations, it is not the intention of this article to suggest that political commitment, detached from personal circumstances, would encourage migrants to engage in activism regardless of risks in Bangkok. This section has instead demonstrated that Bangkok's appeal as an urban city includes not only its political advantages, but for some activists, social and economic ones. The logic of the activist therefore extends beyond considerations of political opportunity.
Tokyo
In 2004 and 2005, a total of 36 migrants were interviewed in Tokyo, 12 with documentation from UNHCR indicating their asylum seeker status, 14 with official protection-related status (either through refugee status or through 'Special Permission' status, and heretofore referred to as 'refugees') 4 migrants with legal documentation (henceforth 'documented migrants'), and 6 with no documentation.
Precarity in Tokyo
This article does not delve into the additional numerous sub-categories into which migrants can fall; prior work has detailed this (Banki 2006; Dean 2006). What is important is that, in Japan (and in contrast to Thailand), refugee status proffers its holders freedom to travel and reside anywhere in Japan, although they cannot return to Burma and may have difficulty securing visas to other countries. Conversely, documented migrants can reside in Japan easily and travel freely internationally, assuming their visas to remain in Japan remain valid. Thus, precarity (and its lack) for documented migrants is linked to the length of the visa.
For other categories, Japan has experienced some of the same cyclical waves of permission and restriction as occurred in Thailand, although the peaks and troughs have been perhaps less pronounced. In the years 2004 and 2005, a pervasive atmosphere of precarity characterized their experience, which reflected an increasingly tough stance on migrants by the Japanese government. First, the Government of Japan (GoJ) started enforcing a policy (on the books for a long time, but ignored) that employers could be fined and imprisoned for hiring undocumented migrants. Second, massive sweeps were conducted to reduce the undocumented population. To more easily identify the undocumented -both those with no papers whatsoever and those whose visas had expired (i.e. overstayers) -there was even an email address to which citizens could send anonymous information about undocumented foreigners.
These restrictions meant that one of the advantages of urban space, and a particular asset in Tokyo -an extensive and relatively inexpensive public transportation system -was underutilised by precarious populations. Several respondents noted that a fear of train conductors limited their use of trains, and hence, because taxis are prohibitively expensive in Tokyo, their ability to easily travel outside of walking distance. This fear was not unfounded;
in early 2004 two Burmese overstayers were arrested on their way to attend a political meeting, 21 and in mid-2005 four others were arrested at train stations on their way to work. 22 For those seeking asylum, significant changes that went into effect in May 2005 actually decreased the precarity of this population, at least in the short term. First, asylum seekers who previously were placed into detention simply for seeking asylum were now eligible for provisional release, which permitted them to reside in Japan while their claim was being decided, although it offered no rights to work or travel outside one's regional area (prefecture), and has thus been labelled "limited legal status" (Dean 2006: 25) . Second, the '60-day rule', which held that asylum applications must be made within 60 days of arrival in 
Homeland Activism
Tokyo plays a far greater role as a centre for homeland activism in Japan, relative to Bangkok in Thailand. Two reasons clearly explain this phenomenon. First, as already noted, the GoJ permits its refugee population to reside in urban areas, while the RTG no longer does.
Second, most migrants to Japan arrive by airplane, and Tokyo is the most direct port of arrival, so migrants' first stop would be Tokyo. Burmese, Japanese, and English. One interviewee suggested that signs were often written in English at protests because English-speaking newspapers were more likely to cover the protests. 25 Posters generally commemorated specific political anniversaries, called for Aung San Suu Kyi's release, or urged the restoration of democracy in Burma.
It has been argued elsewhere that a triadic relationship between transnational events, legal status, and local community informs the ways in which Burmese in Japan engage in public contentious events, which skews what might otherwise be our assumptions about which legal categories will go public and which will be concealed (Banki 2006). For example, documented migrants did not protest publicly because it would impact their ability to travel back to Burma. They did not want their faces known to Burmese authorities, and embassy officials have been known to film the gatherings outside their embassy. 26 Conversely, protests were heavily attended by those we might consider at the mid-precarity level: asylum seekers. This can be explained by several factors. First, asylum seekers believed that their cases would be substantiated more easily if they could prove political involvement in Japan. Second, they believed that such public action could, perhaps counterintuitively, reduce their precarity. Those with provisional release could still be stopped by the police, who often asked for 'evidence' of asylum claims. Some asylum seekers in fact carried photographs of themselves in the process of demonstrating for this reason. 27 This support's Shah's argument that those with uncertain legal status have an additional incentive to engage in public activism if they believe that it will help support their asylum claims (Shah 1999 ).
The prohibition against working served as an incentive to asylum seekers to maximise their time in the safest way possible. The reasoning was: the best way to limit the chance of being deported is to avoid working, and the best way to improve the chance of obtaining refugee status is to engage in demonstrations (this belief was prevalent, UNHCR's insistence to the contrary notwithstanding). This fact is not meant to imply that asylum seekers only chose to demonstrate in order to gain legal recognition, but it did make them more likely to choose this activity over others, because demonstrations are a clear and simple message to the refugee regime in Japan: I don't like my country's government, and I will be in danger if I return. Thus the 'logic of the activist' encourages some forms of mobilisation over others.
Not surprisingly, undocumented migrants were notably absent from protests, despite comprising a significant portion of the Burmese population in Tokyo. For many years, overstayers were in fact present at protests, because "police were reluctant to arrest people when they were at a demonstration. There was no policy on this but we thought that there would be political repercussions from arresting people when they were protesting." 28 Then, in 2004, an overstayer who often protested at the Burmese embassy was arrested and deported back to Burma, whereupon he was detained straight from the airport. This sobering account, which circulated from Rangoon and back to Tokyo, discouraged any remaining overstayers who had been present at protests. 29 Third, both undocumented and documented migrants attended periodic meetings, targeted at their ethnic groups, where they kept abreast of specific news from their ethnic states. In addition, nearly all of the ethnic minority activists interviewed were likely to attend monthly meetings of the recently-formed Association of United Nationalities (AUN), an umbrella group constituted by all of the ethnic minorities from Burma. This included Shan, Karen, Kachin, Chin, Paluang, and Arakan migrants, for example, but notably excluded the Rohingya, because 'they aren't part of the original race of the country, and they get help from Islamic countries anyway' (demonstrating that discrimination crosses borders as easily as do migrants). 30 In addition to sharing current events information, AUN meetings allowed ethnic groups to coalesce around broader questions of governance and decision-making processes, building trust and sharing common experiences of oppression, such as one discussion about the effects on ordinary villagers of the poppy plantations in northern Shan state. 31 These meetings were held in areas regularly frequented by Burmese migrants, such as Takadanobaba Undocumented migrants aided those with greater security to sift through fact-finding reports and highlight the most damning human rights testimonials to present to Mr. Ismail. Such research, which can be carried out by the most precarious, requires little more than a good internet connection and access to good printing facilities, something in abundance in Tokyo.
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Tokyo's 'Logic of the Activist'
Tokyo is the epitome of the global city, with anonymity, public transportation, ethnic enclaves, and international powerholders in abundance. These urban features, however, had little ability to trump precarity, because stricter adherence to legal documentation in Japan minimised some of the advantages of urbanity and at the same time magnified activists' reliance upon documented migrants, subsequently complicating the relationship between urbanity and precarity. The highly precarious engaged only in invisible acts of contention (remittances and private periodic meetings), and participated minimally. This can be explained by: 1) the specificity of Japan's danger zones for migrants (including public transportation and outside public spaces); 2) the difficulty of making activism a lucrative enough form of employment to carry out activities full time; and 3) recently adopted asylum seeker policies.
Paradoxically, migrants' decisions about which activities to conduct reflect the same 'logic of the activist' discussed in the Bangkok section, with different results. In Tokyo, public events held a dual function: to raise public awareness about the abuses of the Burmese regime, and to validate asylum seekers' claims. As a global city, Tokyo facilitates these dual roles, thus supporting Sassen's claim that it is one of the "new geographies of centrality at the interurban level," creating a "thick enabling environment" for the airing of "transboundary issues concerning immigration, asylum, international women's agendas, and anti-globalization struggles" (2002a: 217).
Comparison and Conclusion
Data analysing homeland activism in Bangkok and Tokyo yielded similar and dissimilar results. Homeland activism continued despite increasing precarity, although the shape of activism changed as policies did. That is, precarity seems to have had a strong concealment effect on homeland activism, as precarious populations generally engaged in less visible action. In both cities, access to powerholders permitted lobbying that would have been difficult in other locations in the country. In Bangkok particularly, urban structures such as technology and communication improved the ability to engage in media information collection and distribution, mitigating precarity and enabling mobilisation. For more visible actions, such as protests, urban structures offered little assistance in facilitating the most precarious migrants' participation.
The research further found that possession of specific documentation was not the only factor to determine precarity. Nor were RTG and GoJ policies -in place for many years, but inconsistently applied -effective in stopping homeland activism. The research supports
Greer's contention that "the city no longer controls much of its own destiny, because its polity is subject to decisions that originate far beyond its own boundaries," (Greer 1989 it supports the notion of the 'logic of the activist', suggesting that we account for the personal and familial choices that activists make, as well as those that are politically and strategically expedient. Practically, the findings suggest that restrictive immigration policy does not necessarily reduce homeland activism, but may change its outward appearance so that precarious migrants choose clandestine repertoires of contention. Precarious migrant
